Key To Healthcare Reform: Lively Competition, Not The Dead Hand Of Government Compulsion

Imagine the sort of car you’d drive if government regulations made it illegal to sell any automobile that didn’t feature 380-horsepower direct-injection V6 engines, computer-controlled electric power steering, eight-speed automatic transmission, four-wheel-drive, automatic climate control, “smart key” technology, touch-screen navigation, backup cameras, LED headlights, acoustic glass, surround-sound stereo, and leather seat stitching.

If those were the minimum requirements every car had to meet before it could be sold, would you commute to and from work every day in a Lexus LS 460 or some other luxury vehicle? Well, you might, if the steep price wasn’t an obstacle. But it’s more likely you wouldn’t be driving at all. If the government barred you from buying anything but a high-end car, you’d probably have no choice but to rely on the bus or subway, or to find a job closer to home.

What is true of transportation is true of everything else: Increase the number of amenities that a product or service must include, and more consumers will be unable to pay for that product or service. That is why one of the simplest strategies for making health insurance more affordable is to reduce the minimum number of benefits that insurers are required to cover.

In every state in the union, legislators and regulators drive up the cost of healthcare by making insurance policies more comprehensive. Rather than allow the free market to determine which medical services health plans will cover, states force consumers to pay for an array of covered benefits they may not need or want.

The key to healthcare reform is lively competition, not the dead hand of government compulsion. Legislators, take note: Enacting new mandates won’t make medical insurance more affordable. Repealing old ones just might.

MP: It’s a basic law of economics (Perry’s Law) that market competition breeds competence (and lower prices) and government restrictions on competition and market forces breed incompetence (and higher prices). If we want affordable health care, we should encourage more competition, not less; and less government intervention, not more.

Industry Outlook For Non-U.S. Banks

In general, we believe it is still a bit early to get involved with non-US bank stocks as the fundamental outlook remains weak — asset quality will continue to deteriorate as individuals and companies default on loans, and revenues should continue to fall as loan growth falters and investment banking faces a dearth of new business in the face of economic slowing.

Consumer job losses and sluggish business conditions are increasing worldwide, which will tend to dampen demand for credit, even assuming banks are capable of lending more. Moreover, these factors will also hurt asset quality and increase losses on the existing “good” loan portfolios, even apart from considerations of toxic assets. Combined with top-line pressure due to weakening economic conditions, non-US banks face a daunting outlook.

That said, we believe that banks in stable emerging economies, such as Chile, Brazil or India, may be more attractive investments — similar to what we expect for certain regional banks in the US. To be sure, banks in emerging economies will face asset quality issues; however, they are not confronted with other significant problems that many of the larger banks in Europe and the United Kingdom are, such as toxic securities, dilution from capital raising and dividend cuts/omissions. Moreover, these emerging market banks generally tend to be well capitalized, aren’t as heavily exposed to the property markets, and have significant and generally growing sources of noninterest income.

In fact, Zacks-covered banks in Latin America and Asia have outperformed both the S&P 500 year to date, as well as Zacks-covered banks in Europe and the United Kingdom, increasing 40.1% and 27.7%, respectively, versus gains of 3.3% for the S&P 500 and 10.6% for banks in Europe and the United Kingdom.

There are several caveats one should consider when investing in these banks. First, investment in non-US ADR bank stocks entails foreign currency risk. Currently, the US$ is appreciating against many foreign currencies, which tends to depress US$ share performance. On the other hand, when this turns and the US$ starts falling against other foreign currencies, this will accelerate gains in US$. More importantly, we expect stock prices to continue volatile, reflecting economic uncertainty in the coming months and headline risk.

OPPORTUNITIES

Specific banks that we like include Itau Unibanco Holding S.A. (ITUB: 17.55 0.00 0.00%) in Brazil, Banco Santander Santiago (SAN: 49.23 0.00 0.00%) in Chile and HDFC Bank Limited (HDB: 92.51 0.00 0.00%) in India.

ITUB is the largest bank in Brazil following the February 2009 merger of Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros S.A. and Banco Itau Holding Financeira S.A., with R$575 billion (US$240 billion) in assets, 4,800 branches, and a 19% share of the Brazilian loan market.

SAN is the largest private bank in Chile (total assets of Ch$21,137 billion or US$33.6 billion at year-end 2008) and is 77% owned by Banco Santander Central Hispano, the largest bank in Spain and one of the largest in Europe.

HDB is now one of the largest banks in India, with Rs183,271 crores, or US $35.1 billion, and a retail network of 1,412 branches and 3,295 ATMs in 528 cities for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2009.

There are currently three stocks in the Zacks covered non-US bank universe with a Zacks ranking of 1 (Strong Buy) — Credit Suisse Group (CS: 44.96 0.00 0.00%), HDFC Bank Limited and ICICI Bank Limited (IBN: 29.73 0.00 0.00%) — and three stocks that have a Zacks rank of 2 (Buy) — Itau Unibanco Holding S.A., Banco Bradesco S.A. (BBD: 15.42 0.00 0.00%) and Deutsche Bank AG (DB: 65.91 0.00 0.00%).

WEAKNESSES

We would avoid the larger banks in the Great Britain and Ireland, particularly those that that have participated in government recapitalization programs, such as The Royal Bank of Scotland Bank plc (RBS: 14.29 0.00 0.00%) and Lloyds Banking Group plc (LYG: 5.50 0.00 0.00%) in Britain and Allied Irish Banks (AIB: 4.50 0.00 0.00%) and The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland (IRE: 9.58 0.00 0.00%). In return for the government capital and asset quality protection, these banks must submit to other government intervention, including limits on dividend payouts and nomination of board members. This will limit their financial flexibility for awhile and raise issues of complete nationalization, which could continue to hurt share price performance.

Current Sells include Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. (BBV: 15.34 0.00 0.00%) and Banco Santander Central Hispano, S.A. (STD: 13.86 0.00 0.00%), both headquartered in Spain. In Spain, the recent collapse in housing and construction, which propelled economic growth for the last decade, is expected to stall for the next few years. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) believes that Spain will be harder-hit by the global economic downturn than other European countries. Indeed, Spain’s unemployment rate was 17.4% at the end of March, more than double the level a year ago.

There is currently one stock in the Zacks covered non-US bank universe with a Zacks ranking of 5 (Strong Sell) — Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. — and one stock that has a Zacks rank of 4 (Sell)– Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc. (MTU: 5.71 0.00 0.00%).

How The Once-Respected Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac Helped Fuel The U.S. Real Estate Bubble

Fannie Mae (FNM: 0.59 0.00 0.00%), originally designated as a “government-sponsored enterprise” (GSE), was born in 1938 as a child of U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Great-Depression-fighting “New Deal,” and was designed to stimulate mortgage lending.

Fast-forward 30 years. In 1968, Fannie Mae shares were sold to the public to help finance the Vietnam War.

Freddie Mac (FRE: 0.62 0.00 0.00%), also a GSE, was created by Congress in 1970 to compete with the growing - but monopolistic - Fannie Mae.

Both firms were successful, profitable and made steady money by charging a fee to guarantee mortgage-originators against homeowner defaults. Their combined guarantees totaled almost $3.7 trillion at the end of 2008.

They also developed high standards for loans that they themselves would buy and then package into mortgage-backed securities (MBS). They sold these pools of “conforming” loans to institutional investors and made even bigger profits as the MBS business exploded.

It all changed in the 1990s for Fannie and Freddie. Intensely competitive banks and investment banks aggressively rounded up their own pools of mortgage loans to package and sell to eager investors. Non-bank originators - the largest and most aggressive of which was Countrywide Financial Corp. - were eager to supply the growing demand for mortgages to be pooled and sold to investors

The resulting “velocity” of mortgage money meant that competition for good borrowers became tremendous as easy and cheap money flooded the economy. To keep mortgage origination pipelines full, standards began to fall. New products were created to entice new borrowers. Subprime, Alt-A, Pick-A-Pay, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS), and a host of other offerings brought in lower quality borrowers who eagerly bet the farm their homes and their futures on the rising real estate bubble’s ascent to investment and speculative heaven.

In the end, however, real estate was merely the latest financial bubble, which burst like all of its predecessors.

What Is China Saying? Sustainability And Indirect Bidding

Reading through the financial tea leaves this morning, I am struck by two developments yesterday. In the midst of the U.S.-Chinese economic summit in Washington, little surprise that Chinese diplomats voiced concern about the U.S. fiscal deficit. The Wall Street Journal highlighted this topic in reporting Chinese Convey Concern on Growing U.S. Debt:

A show of unity from the U.S. and China at the end of a high-profile two-day conference was overshadowed by continuing Chinese concerns about the U.S.’s growing pile of debt.

The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a forum designed to foster closer cooperation, closed on a similar note to that set at the start by President Barack Obama, who stressed the countries’”mutual interests.”

The two powers vowed to maintain efforts to pull the global economy out of recession and shore up financial markets. They also agreed on a plan to create more-balanced global growth in the future.

But like a banker visiting an overextended borrower, Chinese economic leaders repeatedly conveyed to their U.S. hosts the importance of managing the U.S. debt. Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan, in talks with Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and other officials, urged the U.S. to protect the value of the dollar.

“As a major reserve currency-issuing country in the world, the U.S. should balance and properly handle the impact of the dollar’s supply,” Mr. Wang said through an interpreter Tuesday.

China’s Finance Minister Xie Xuren said the delegation “expressed the view that credible steps should be taken to prevent fiscal risks and to ensure sustainability” and that “high attention should be given to fiscal deficits.” He said Mr. Geithner “stated clearly” that the U.S. is placing “a lot of importance” on the deficit.

What exactly do the Chinese mean by sustainability? Clearly, they are emphasizing the need for America to lessen its deficit, which will likely surpass $2 trillion this year alone.

While Chinese officials made these strong statements regarding our deficit, the U.S. Treasury auctioned $42 billion in 2 yr notes. How were these notes received? Not very well. In fact, the indirect bidders only purchased 33% versus close to 69% a month ago.

Who are these indirect bidders? Recall that on June 1, with no fanfare or warning, Treasury redefined ‘indirect bidders’ in our Treasury auctions. I highlighted this topic in “Turbo-Tim Takes ‘Indirect’ to a Whole New Level”:

Geithner just redefined ‘indirect’ buying in our U.S. Treasury auction process without a hint that this major piece of information was even up for review. Let’s look deeper into this sleight of hand. The Wall Street Journal sheds a little bit of light on this development in Is Foreign Demand as Solid as It Looks?

The sudden increase in demand by foreign buyers for Treasurys, hailed as proof that the world’s central banks are still willing to help absorb the avalanche of supply, mightn’t be all that it seems.

When the government sells bonds, traders typically look at a group of buyers called indirect bidders, which includes foreign central banks, to divine overseas demand for U.S. debt. That demand has been rising recently, giving comfort to investors that foreign buyers will continue to finance the U.S.’s budget deficit.

But in a little-noticed switch on June 1, the Treasury changed the way it accounts for indirect bids, putting more buyers under that umbrella and boosting the portion of recent Treasury sales that the market perceived were being bought by foreigners.

In light of this newly redefined measure of indirect bidding, 33% is an extremely low level. Did the Chinese take a shot across our bow and pass on yesterday’s 2yr auction? Things that make you go, “hmmmm . . .”

Golden Cross In S&P 500

About a week ago the S&P 500 50-SMA (simple moving average) crossed up through the 200-SMA. (See chart below.) This is known as a “Golden Cross” because it is interpreted by many as a sign that the market is turning long-term bullish. Of course, this generated enormous optimism among the market cheerleader crowd, most of whom do not use technical analysis unless it supports their position. On the other hand, a highly regarded economist/market analyst blew his stack that anyone could be so lame-brained to use such a simple event to imply that the market was about to go ballistic. Since both sides of this argument regarding a technical event are offered by people who are fundamental analysts, I thought it would be useful to present a technician’s point of view.

First of all, a 50/200-SMA crossover means nothing to this technician because I use exponential moving averages, and a golden cross has not yet occurred on the 50/200-EMAs. (See my article of June 19.) Second, if we were to get a 50/200-EMA golden cross, it would be an important event, but it would not be a sign to pile back into the market with both feet.

A golden cross applies only to the price index where it occurs. With the S&P 500 it means, based upon price movement, the broad market is turning positive, and, in technical terms, we will have entered a long-term bull market. At that point we would shift our emphasis away from shorts and toward longs. We would start assessing indicators and setups based on the assumption that we were in a bull market.

Sure, false signals are generated, but we can only act on what we know. In this case we would begin to look for medium- and short-term setups for long positions. If the LT buy signal fails, chances are that good setups will not be very common, and good position management will limit losses. A golden cross is not useless, nor is it a signal to throw caution to the wind. It is really an information signal, not an action signal.

The next chart shows the current market conditions using EMAs. Note that we are still awaiting the golden cross. More immediate to our attention is the fact that a fully developed head and shoulders pattern has formed, and Thursday’s decline appears to be setting up challenge to the neckline. If the pattern executes (the price index violates the neckline), the minimum downside target is about 810.

If the pattern fails to execute and prices rally off the neckline, it will tell us that medium-term bullish forces are still in effect.

Bottom Line: The golden cross is a positive sign and gives us information about the market’s condition and trend. If it occurs, don’t overreact or ignore it. There is currently a head and shoulders pattern that is on the verge of violating its neckline. If that happens, it would be a pretty good sign that the rally is over.